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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, DOCKET NO. 40017 
Plaintiff - Appellant 
v. 
TENNISON MICHAEL SILVER, 
Defendant - Respondent 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the 5th Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Jerome 
Honorable John K. Butler, District Judge 
Attorney for Appellant 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General 
Paul P. Panther, Deputy Attorney General, Chief, Criminal Law Division 
Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
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Wright Brothers Law Office, PLLC 
1166 Eastland Drive North 
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Twin Falls, ID 83303 
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This case arises from the arrest of Defendant/Respondent Tennison Silver ("Silver") 
following statements made to law enforcement officers. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On December 2, 2011, Silver was arrested for driving under the influence, a 
misdemeanor in violation ofldaho Code § 18-8004 and for possession of a controlled substance 
with the intent to deliver, a felony in violation ofldaho Code § 3 7-2732(a). 1 On February 22, 
2012, the preliminary hearing was held on the felony charge and Silver was bound over to 
answer the charge in district court.2 On March 14, 2012, the Court entered an order 
consolidating the misdemeanor case with the felony case at issue.3 
On April 9, 2012, Silver filed the Defendant's Motion to Suppress/Motion in Limine (the 
"Motion").4 On April 30, 2012, a hearing was held on Silver's Motion. 5 On May 11, 2012, the 
IR. P.9. 
2 R. P. 2; R. P. 33; R. P. 35-36. 
3 R. P. 48-50. 
4 R. P. 55-61. 
5 R. P. 3-4; R. P. 68-70. 
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district court lodged its Memorandum of Decision on Defendant's Motion to Suppress (the 
"Decision"), which granted Silver's Motion. 6 On May 29, 2011, the State appealed the district 
court's decision to suppress statements made by Silver.7 
C. Statement of Facts 
On December 1, 2011 at approximately 11:57 p.m., Silver was stopped by Officer John 
Lenker ("Lenker"). 8 Lenker's stated reason for stopping Silver was that he rolled through a stop 
sign and exceeded the posted speed limit. 9 Shortly after stopping Silver, Lenker took possession 
of Silver's driver's license, which was not returned to Silver during the course of the stop. 10 
Early in the stop, Lenker detected the smell of marijuana in the car being driven by 
Silver. 11 At that point, Lenker asked Silver why he was smelling marijuana, and Silver replied 
that he was at a friend's house and the friend had been smoking marijuana.12 After asking Silver 
about the smell, Lenker returned to his vehicle to speak with Officer Jason Kelly ("Kelly"), who 
arrived at the scene shortly after Silver was stopped. 13 Kelly arrived in a separate marked 
vehicle, both officers were in uniform and both officers were armed. 14 When Lenker returned to 
Kelly, he advised Kelly that he could smell the marijuana coming from the car, that Silver's 
tongue was brown and not green and that "aside from the shaking, like he's real nervous, I'm not 
getting anything else off of him." 15 
6 R. P. 71-86. 
7 R. P. 87-90. 
8 R. P. 7; Tr. P. 7, LL. 9-14. 
9 Tr. P. 6, LL. 8-14. 
10 Tr. P. 9, LL. 2-7. 
11 Tr. P. 9, LL. 20-25, P. 10, LL. 1-2. 
12 Tr. P. P. 10, LL. 3-5. 
13 Tr. P. 11,LL. 1-8; Exhibit A, 4: 10. 
14 Tr. P. 7, LL. 15-25, P. 8, LL. l-8. 
15 Tr.P. ll,LL. l-8;ExhibitA,4:10-4:43. 
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Shortly thereafter, Lenker returned to Silver and asked him to step out of the vehicle in 
order to conduct field sobriety tests. 16 During the field sobriety tests, Kelly observed a plastic 
baggie hanging out of Silver's coat. 17 Lenker then grabbed the baggie out of Silver's coat, and 
demanded "why are you going to lie to me like that? When was the last time you smoked it?" 18 
Silver then admitted that he had smoked approximately thirty minutes prior to the stop. 19 
Lenker then asked Silver if he had "pipes or anything else" on him.20 When Silver 
denied this, Lenker advised Silver that if "I end up taking you to jail and if you have anything 
else on you, and you don't disclose it to me, that's introducing contraband into a secure 
facility."21 Lenker then asked Silver again if he had anything else on him that Lenker "needed to 
worry about."22 Lenker again asked if there was anything else in the car, and specifically 
inquired ifthere were papers or more weed.23 At that time, Kelly advised Silver that because of 
what he had found in Silver's pocket, Kelly could "rip [Silver's] car apart."24 Lenker then 
advised Silver to "be straight man. "25 
At that point, Silver acknowledged there was approximately one more ounce of 
marijuana in the vehicle. 26 At that point, Lenker asked Silver, "so, are you dealing, are you just 
using, what's going on?"27 Silver then stated that he was dropping it off to a friend's house. 28 
As Lenker continued the tests, Silver stated that the officers are going to take him to jail, no 
16 Tr. P. 11, LL. 22-25, P. 12, L. 1. 
17 Tr. P. 12, LL. 12-25, P. 13, L. 1. 
18 Exhibit A, 6: 15-6:22. 
19 Exhibit A, 6:25. 
20 Exhibit A, 6:39. 
21 Tr. P. 13, LL. 6-22; Exhibit A, 6:48-6:59. 
22 Exhibit A, 7:01. 
23 Exhibit A, 7:01-7:06. 
24 Tr.P.14,LL.18-25,P.15,LL. l-17;ExhibitA, 7:07-7:10. 
25 Tr.P.15,LL.18-2l;ExhibitA, 7:11-7:12. 
26 Tr. P. 14, LL. 18-22; Exhibit A, 7:12-7:20. 
27 Tr. P. 16, LL. 10-21; Exhibit A, 7:19-7:21. 
28 Exhibit A, 7:22. 
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matter what happened with the tests. 29 Lenker confirmed that, given the amount of marijuana 
found in the vehicle, it was likely that he would be anesting him. 30 Lenker then asked Silver if 
he would be willing to work his detectives to "work this off' in order to "catch the big fish. "31 
Silver then expressed fear that his uncle, who is in law enforcement, would be 
disappointed in Silver. 32 Lenker then advised Silver that his uncle will be a lot less disappointed 
in Silver if he was honest with Lenker. 33 Lenker then stated that he knew Silver's uncle really 
well and asked Silver how his uncle would feel if he found out Silver was lying to the cops.34 
Lenker then confirmed that Silver's uncle would be "pissed" if he found out Silver lied to the 
1. 35 po ice. 
Shortly thereafter, Silver was placed in handcuffs, placed in the police car and taken to 
the police station.36 Lenker continued to question Silver.37 At no point were his Miranda rights 
read to Silver. 38 
IV. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Was the district court correct in granting Defendant's Motion to Suppress/Motion in 
Limine? 
V. ARGUMENT 
The sole issue this Court needs to determine is whether the district court was correct in 
finding that Silver was in custody for the purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 
1602 (U.S. 1966). The importance of this issue cannot be overstated. As Silver only had one 
29 Tr. P. 16, LL. 22-25; Exhibit A,8:47-8:48. 
30 Exhibit A, 8:59-9:05. 
31 Tr. P. 17, LL. 6-9; Exhibit A, 9:12-9:50. 
32 Exhibit A, 10:03-10:04. 
33 Tr.P.17,LL.10-14;ExhibitA, 10:07-10:20. 
34 Exhibit A, 10:07-10:20. 
35 Exhibit A, 10:07-10:20. 
36 Exhibit A, 13: 10. 
37 ExhibitA, 13:10-17:45. 
38 Tr.P. 17,LL.15-17. 
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ounce of marijuana in his possession, the only felony exposure that Silver has is for intent to 
deliver, and on! y then if his statement that he was taking it to a friend's house is allowed into 
evidence. See Idaho Code§ 37-2732(a)(l); Idaho Code§ 37-2732(c)(3); and Idaho Code§ 37-
2732(e). 
1. Standard of Review 
On review, Idaho appellate courts apply a bifurcated analysis. State v. Frank, 133 Idaho 
364, 369, 986 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Ct. App. 1999). So long as the district court's findings of fact 
are supported by substantial evidence, such findings will not be disturbed. Id. The appellate 
court will then independently determine whether the constitutional requirements are satisfied in 
light of such findings of fact. Id. 
2. The district court was correct in granting Defendant's Motion to Suppress/Motion in 
Limine, as the Defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation without having 
been read his Miranda rights. 
The United States Supreme Court has determined that once a person is in custody, the 
police are required to give, prior to any questioning, various warnings, including the right to 
remain silent and the right to counsel. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Supreme Court articulated 
that by "custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after 
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way." Id. (emphasis added). A person is in custody when his "freedom of action is 
curtained to a degree associated with formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 
104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (U.S. 1984). The relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable man in the 
suspect's position would have believed his freedom was curtained to such a degree. Id. at 442. 
To determine whether the suspect is in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation. State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 577, 225 P.3d 1169, 1172 (2010). 
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Such factors may include the location of the interrogation, the conduct of the officers, the nature 
and manner of the questioning, the time of the inten-ogation and other persons present. State v. 
Albaugh, 133 Idaho 587, 591, 990 P.2d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Generally, questioning pursuant to a routine traffic stop is not subject to the safeguards of 
Miranda. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439; Albaugh, 133 Idaho at 592. However, the fact that 
questioning takes place during a traffic stop is not, on its own, determinative as to the 
applicability of Miranda. In State v. Dice, 126 Idaho 595, 887 P.2d 1102 (Ct. App. 1994) the 
Idaho Court of Appeals cautioned as follows: 
It appears, therefore, that limited questioning by an officer in an 
investigatory stop is permissible, but must be confined to general 
identification matters and confirming or dispelling the suspicion that 
resulted in the stop. If these questions provide the officer with probable 
cause, then an an-est may be made. If no probable cause arises, the 
detainee should then be permitted to leave. 
*** 
The reason for not requiring Miranda warnings prior to investigatory stop 
questioning lies in the determination that a detainee is not in custody or 
subject to restrain equivalent to formal custody during the stop and 
therefore Miranda does not apply. It is, of course, always possible that the 
initial investigatory stop may be transformed into custody by virtue of the 
questioning or conduct of the police. In such a situation, the failure to 
properly advise a detainee of his Miranda protections would make any 
further statements inadmissible. 
Dice, 126 Idaho at 599, 600 (emphasis added). 
In Frank, the Idaho Court of Appeals was called on to determine whether a suspect was 
in custody for the purposes of Miranda, where the suspect was handcuffed and placed in the 
back of a police car while the police searched a vacant building and subsequently removed from 
the police car, where the police continued to question him. Frank, 133 Idaho at 369-70. In 
finding that the suspect was in custody for such purposes, the Idaho Court of Appeals observed 
as follows: 
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During the full course of this investigation, Frank remained in handcuffs 
and was basically restricted to the police vehicle. Although this 
continuous restrain did not amount to an actual arrest, Frank's freedom of 
action was curtained to a degree associated with formal arrest. 
Id. at 370 (emphasis in original). 
Likewise, in State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 798 P.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1990), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals determined that a suspect was in custody for the purposes of Miranda. Myers, 
118 Idaho at 611. In Myers, the suspect was pulled over by four police vehicles (three marked 
and one unmarked), which officers remained on the scene after the suspect was stopped. Id. 
Shortly after the stop, the officers immediately began questioning the suspect about drugs and 
paraphernalia. Id. at 611-12. 
The State relies on James to support its claim that Silver was not subject to a custodial 
interrogation. However, this reliance is misplaced. In James, the Idaho Supreme Court held that 
"a conditional threat of future lawful arrest alone does not transform a detention into 'custody' 
for purposes of Miranda." James, 148 Idaho at 576 (underlined emphasis added). 
However, unlike the suspect in James, Silver's interrogation was not limited to the threat 
of future, lawful arrest. In fact, the threat of future arrest was only one of a myriad of factors that 
suggest that Silver was subject to a custodial interrogation. It was past midnight by the time the 
officers began questioning Silver about marijuana.39 Likewise, there were two officers at the 
scene, late at night, both in marked vehicles, both in uniform and both armed. 40 There were no 
other people present at the scene. In addition, as with the officers in Myers, the questioning 
exceeded the scope of the investigatory stop. As noted by the district court, there would be no 
39 Tr. P. 7, LL. 9-14. 
40 Tr. P. 7, LL. 15-25, P. 8, LL. 1-8. 
- 8 - ~ Respondent's Brief 
[ 
reason for the officers to inquire as to Silver's intended purpose of the marijuana found at the 
1 . d £ 41 scene, other than toe evate a mis emeanor to a elony. 
Given the foregoing, any reasonable person would feel that their freedom had been 
curtailed to a degree associated with arrest. This is especially true in light of the coercive, 
threatening and hostile questions that were asked by the officers during the stop, including 
without limitation, the following: 
Lenker reaching into Silver's pocket and pulling out the baggie of 
•. 42 
manJuana; 
"Why you going to lie to me like that? When was the last time you 
smoked it";43 
Advising Silver that if he did not alert them to any drugs or paraphernalia 
on his person and he was arrested, that he would be introducing 
contraband into a secure facility, which is a felony; 44 
Advising Silver that given what they had found in his pocket, they now 
had the authority "rip [his] car apart" (and knowing such vehicle was not 
Silver's);45 and 
Demanding to know whether Silver was using or dealing.46 
Each of these events occurred before Silver stated that he was taking the marijuana to a friend's 
house.47 Given the foregoing line of questioning, coupled with the late hour, the number of 
officers and the circumstances, a reasonable person would feel that their freedom had been 
curtailed to a degree tantamount to an arrest. 
41 R. P. 84-85. 
42 Exhibit A, 6:15-6:22. 
43 Exhibit A, 6: 15-6:22. 
44 Tr. P. 13, LL. 6-22; Exhibit A, 6:48-6:59. 
45 Tr. P. 14, LL. 18-22; Exhibit A, 7: 12-7:20. 
46 Tr. P. 16, LL. 10-21; Exhibit A, 7:19-7:21. 
47 Exhibit A. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The district court's decision to grant Silver's Jvlotion is supported by the law and the 
record. Given this, Silver respectfully requests the Supreme Court to affirm the district court's 
decision. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this /2.. day of December, 2012. 
WRlGHT BROTHERS LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
By: ~GL ~ 
Brooke B. Redmond 
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